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Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices:
The Certiorari Conundrum
Steven Lubet*
I. DISQUALIFICATION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
A recent newspaper series detailed the relationship between
Justices of the United States Supreme Court and the nominating
committee for the Devitt Award, a prize given annually by West
Publishing Company (West) to a member of the federal judi-
ciary.' The nominating committee traditionally meets at posh
resort locations, where the Justices and their spouses are feted
and entertained, with West directly picking up all expenses.2
As it happens, West had at least five cases pending before the
Supreme Court, in various stages of litigation, during the period
when Supreme Court Justices were enjoying the publisher's
hospitality.3 While there clearly is nothing improper about
Justices serving on the nominating committee for the Devitt
Award, the newspaper series suggested that the Justices should
have refrained from sitting on West's cases, at least during the
period when excursion plans were pending.4
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. I am indebted to Professors
Stephen Gillers, Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Judith Maute, Stephen Calabresi,
Richard Craswell, Ronald Rotunda, Laura Lin, Leigh Bienen, Charlotte Crane,
and Lawrence Marshall for their thoughtful comments and assistance, and to
Heather Jackson for her conscientious research. An excerpt from this piece was
published previously as Steven Lubet, Recusal Can Deny Cert, NATL L.J., Aug.
21, 1995, at A19.
1. Sharon Schmickle & Tom Hamburger, U.S. Justices Took Trips from
West Publishing, STAR TRMB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 5, 1995, at IA. The full title
of the $15,000 prize is the Edward J. Devitt Distinguished Service to Justice
Award. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. During the period 1983-1995, Justices White, Powell, Brennan,
O'Connor, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy all travelled to meetings of the Devitt
Award selection committee. Id. at 15A.
4. The suggestion of disqualification was made in interviews with several
professors of legal ethics, including myself. Id. West subsequently announced
that the the American Judicature Society henceforth would administer the
Devitt Award, rather than West itself, thus mooting the question of future
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Recusal often appears to be the perfect judicial prophylactic
in these situations: if there is a hint of bias, disqualify the
judge.5 At the certiorari stage, however, the disqualification of
a Supreme Court Justice actually may harm the very party it
was intended to protect. Thus, the right of the petitioner to
apparent impartialitymay be secured, but only at the cost of
actual disadvantage when it comes to obtaining Supreme Court
review. I call this paradox "The Certiorari Conundrum" because
it arises only when a Justice appears biased against the party
petitioning for review.
All federal judges, including Justices of the United States
Supreme Court, are disqualified from sitting in cases where their
impartiality reasonably may be questioned, including situations
where the judge has a personal or family financial interest in the
proceeding, has personal knowledge of evidentiary facts, or has
acted as counsel or a witness in the matter.6 Justice Felix
Frankfurter's classic determination that he could not participate
in a case considering a challenge to the playing of music on city
busses in the District of Columbia well illustrates the impor-
tance of the goal of impartiality.' As a frequent rider on the
public transit system, Frankfurter detested the music and
believed that he could not judge the case objectively. Under
the circumstances, he apparently decided that he preferred the
disqualification remedy to either buying an automobile or
walking to work. It is not known how the parties reacted to
Frankfurter's recusal.
Financial interest is probably the most frequent ground for
disqualification of a federal judge,9 although by no means is it
disqualification by participating judges. Lyle Denniston, Junkets to Resorts to
End for Justices, BALTIMORE SUN, May 9, 1995, at 1A; West Co. Won't Run
Awards, NATL L.J., May 22, 1995, at A1O.
5. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for
recusal).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (1988).
7. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1952).
8. Id.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4). Disqualification is required whenever the judge,
or the judge's spouse, holds a financial interest, "however small," in the subject
matter of the controversy or in a party to the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)(4).
The statute requires the judge to keep informed of all such personal, fiduciary,
or family financial interests. 28 U.S.C. § 455(c). Because disqualification is
automatic whenever a judge holds so much as a share of stock in a party to a
proceeding, there are few published opinions applying this provision. In the
overwhelming majority of situations, the judge no doubt announces the
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the exclusive one.' ° For example, the recent nomination of
Stephen Breyer to the United States Supreme Court raised the
question of his participation as a "name" in a Lloyd's of London
insurance syndicate. During the confirmation hearings, Justice
Breyer pledged that he would not participate in any cases that
implicated Lloyd's financial interests." As a member of the
Court, he has declined to sit on cases involving Lloyd's either
directly or indirectly.2 Other nominees in less controversial
circumstances have made similar disqualification commitments.' 3
Since 1992, there have been over 350 cases, petitions, motions,
or applications in which one or more Supreme Court Justices
"took no part."4 By tradition, most Supreme Court Justices do
not announce their reasons for recusal. It is therefore impossible
to know with any precision what the bases were for the great
majority of these disqualifications. 5
existence of a financial interest contemporaneously with a sua sponte recusal
order. The issue tends to be litigated only in unusual circumstances, see
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861 (1988)
(disqualifying a judge on the basis of fiduciary interest, as university trustee,
in outcome of proceeding; judge had forgotten about university's holding until
after ruling in the case), or where a motion for disqualification is denied, see Wu
v. Thomas, 996 F.2d 271, 275 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a judge's status
as unpaid adjunct professor did not amount to a financial interest in defendant
university).
10. See supra text accompanying note 6 (discussing other grounds for
disqualification).
11. See Lyle Denniston, Under Fire, Breyer Offers Plan to Avoid Ethics
Problems as Justice, BALTIMORE SUN, July 15, 1994, at 8A (describing Justice
Breyer's pledge to avoid ethical problems as a Justice).
12. Monroe Freedman, Justice Breyer Takes Ethics Seriously, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1994, at A26.
13. Robert Bork promised that, if confirmed, he would not sit in cases
involving his own prior decisions. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 416 (1987). Justice
Scalia indicated that he would not sit in a case similar to one in which he was
previously involved. Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 71-73 (1986). Justice
Kennedy stated that a judge must recuse himself if his impartiality reasonably
can be questioned. Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 217 (1987).
14. A Lexis search conducted on May 30, 1995, revealed 376 instances in
which the Court announced that one or more Justices "took no part." Of these,
approximately 198 were certiorari petitions and 32 were opinions; the others
were applications, motions, and the like.
15. See DAVID O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT INAMERICAN
PoLrrIcs 226 (3d ed. 1993) (stating that Justices do not have to explain their
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So far, so good. Who can argue with a Justice who, for
reasons of real or apparent bias, financial interest, or simple
caution, has decided that it is best to abstain from participating
in a particular matter? In this regard, seven Justices of the
Supreme Court have set up a procedure whereby law firms that
employ their lawyer-children may notify the Court of their
involvement so that the affected Justice may step aside at the
earliest possible point in the case.'6 Any why not? Controversy
arises when judges hear cases, not when they recuse themselves.
We expect Justices to make the hyper-ethical choice and err on
the side of disqualification. If there is a pale of recusal that
Justices should not cross, does it not make sense to avoid it by
a safe margin? 7 Indeed, the once popular concept of a "duty to
sit" was repudiated long ago by the American Bar Association's
reasons for recusal); Tony Mauro, Stevens Stays Silent on Recusal from Illinois
Abortion Case, AM. LAW., Oct. 10, 1989, at 12 (remarking that Justice Stevens'
recusal from an abortion case without an explanation caused speculation).
Occasionally, it is possible to infer a Justice's reason for disqualification, as in
Turnock v. Ragsdale, 503 U.S. 916 (1992), cert. granted, 493 U.S. 987 (1989),
where Justice Stevens removed himself from a case in which it was known that
his niece served as counsel. See Lawrence Marshall, Family Ties Explain
Justices'Recusals, AM. LAW., Oct. 30, 1989, at 30. From time to time Justices
do discuss their reasons for recusal. Justice O'Connor, for example, recently
donated all of her "frequent ffier miles" to charity so that she could participate
in a case involving retroactive restrictions on their use. Justice Scalia, however,
chose to keep his miles and disqualify himself from the case, explaining that his
children use the mileage awards to visit him. Paul Barrett, During Court's
Recess, Justices Do Seminars With Supreme Style, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1995,
at Al, AT.
16. Supreme Court Justices Adopt Recusal Policy, 15, No. 3, JUD. CONDUCT
REP. 6, 6 (Fall 1993); Statement of Recusal Policy, Supreme Court Release, Nov.
1, 1993 [hereinafter Statement of Recusal Policy]. The seven participating
Justices are William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor,
Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.
17. For example, the seven participating Justices, see supra note 16,
announced that they would disqualify themselves not only when the relative
was actually "acting as a lawyer in the proceeding," but also when the relative,
though no longer directly involved in the matter, had been "lead counsel" at an
earlier stage of the case. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(ii) (1988) (stating
that a judge or Justice may sit so long as a relative within the third degree is
not "acting as a lawyer in the proceeding"); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
Canon 3E(1)(d)(ii) and Commentary (1990) (stating that"[t]he fact that a lawyer
in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the judge
is affiliated does not of itself disqualify the judge."); JEFFREY M. SHAMAN,
STEVEN LUBET & JAMES J. ALFINI, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHIcs 120 (1990)
(explaining that disqualification may be required only if the relative-attorney
is actually representing the party in a case before the judge).
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Model Code of Judicial Conduct," since adopted by the United
States Judicial Conference 9 and embraced by Congress in the
United States Judicial Code.20
H. THE CERTIORARI CONUNDRUM
Here's the rub. Disqualification is a method of safeguarding
a party against some real or seeming disadvantage in liti-
gation.2' Thus, a judge who owns stock in a party-litigant is
disqualified in order to protect the rights of the opposing
party.2 2 By the same token, a judge must step aside where a
close relative "is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding" to
safeguard the interests of the party who is not represented by a
member of the judge's family.' Although many and probably
most judges could be fair in these circumstances, we have
decided collectively that even the appearance of partiality can
undermine our system of justice.' The existence of an appar-
ently favored party necessarily implies the existence of what we
might call a presumptively disfavored party. The presumptively
disfavored litigant is the party who needs the assurance of
fairness provided by the disqualification rules.
But what happens when the Justice's disqualification
actually harms the very party that it was intended to protect?
Imagine the following scenario:
Justice Vera Emet is a substantial investor in the Judson
Corporation. The lawsuit Hinman v. Judson jeopardizes the
very survival of the Judson Corporation, and thus also threatens
to wipe out Justice Emet's entire investment. Undoubtedly,
Justice Emet may not sit in this case because she has a direct
18. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3C (1972); see also
SHAMAN, ET AL., supra note 17, at 101, and cases cited therein (discussing the
repudiated duty to sit).
19. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 4, 376.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988); see H.R. REP. NO. 1453, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C-.AN. 6351, 6355 (abolishing duty to sit).
21. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 99-101.
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4); see also Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition
Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (reversing a judgment and disqualifying a judge
because of financial interest, as a fiduciary, in prevailing party).
23. 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(5)(ii); LEsLIE W. ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFI-
CATION UNDER CANON 3C OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 51 (1986);
SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 119 (his rule seeks to prevent litigants from
seeking favoritism from a judge by retaining a judge's relative as counsel.").
24. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 99-101.
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and significant financial interest in the outcome.25
Now consider this elaboration. The Judson Corporation
prevailed in the lower court, and Hinman is seeking review in
the United States Supreme Court. In other words, Hinman, the
presumptively disfavored party, petitions for a writ of certiorari.
A minimum of four affirmative votes from the Court is required
to grant a writ.2 6  No provision reduces that number 7 or
makes any other adjustment" when a Justice is disqualified.29
Thus, Justice Emet's mandatory recusal reduces the available
pool of certiorari votes from nine to eight,"° to the detriment of
Hinman, the party who is supposed to be protected by the
disqualification. Were Justice Emet to sit, Hinman would need
to attract only 4/9 of the Court's votes; without her, the petition-
er needs the agreement of one half of the Justices.
In certiorari, only "Yes" votes count. Without four positive
votes, a petition will not be granted."' An abstention, therefore,
is indistinguishable from a "No." The functional result of the
disqualification rule thus is to compel Justice Emet to vote
against the presumptively disfavored party. On the other hand,
if Justice Emet were free to participate in the certiorari decision,
25. The Justice may not sit where she holds even a de minimis financial
interest "in a party to the proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), (d)(4); see also
supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing disqualification for financial
interest).
26. The four-vote rule is a matter of Supreme Court practice or tradition;
it is not imposed by rule or statute. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME
COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 264 (1987). Nothing apart from self-restraint
prevents the court from granting review on the basis of three votes, or even two.
It might be more difficult to condition certiorari on a majority vote, as the
existence of the four-vote rule was instrumental in persuading Congress to pass
the Judiciary Act of 1925, which expanded the Court's discretionary jurisdiction
and reduced the burden of mandatory appeals. O'BRIEN, supra note 15, at 247.
27. Justice Stanley Reed once suggested that three votes might be sufficient
to grant certiorari in certain circumstances. "There is really no absolute rule
that four votes are necessary when a full Court sits. Certainly when there are
only six Jiustices sitting, it seems that three should be sufficient to justify a
hearing on the merits." O'BRIEN, supra note 15, at 247.
28. It currently is not possible to assign a substitute Justice to the Supreme
Court, even in cases where the court lacks a quorum and is therefore unable to
act. 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1988); see infra note 79 (discussing that if the Supreme
Court, by reason of disqualification, lacks a quorum for a particular case, the
matter must be affirmed as though by an equally divided court).
29. O'BRIEN, supra note 15, at 247.
30. See Statement of Recusal Policy, supra note 16.
31. But see supra notes 26-27 and infra text accompanying note 66




at least a possibility exists that she would vote with the
petitioner. In individual cases, then, the recusal of the Justice
deprives the petitioner, and only the petitioner, of the chance
that the disqualified Justice might provide the decisive fourth
vote.
The individual petitioner's loss of chance for Supreme Court
review is not trivial. Assuming any distribution of certiorari
votes and any probability that an individual Justice will vote in
favor of a particular petition, the reduction to eight Justices
always reduces the already-slight likelihood of obtaining
certiorari. This result obtains because only the fourth vote
actually matters. In other words, three positive votes bring the
same result as none-the petition will be denied. Once there are
three positive votes, however, the fourth becomes crucial because
it alone operates to allow review. If nine Justices are sitting and
three have decided to vote in favor of certiorari, six Justices
remain available from whom to gather a single vote. Once a
Justice is disqualified, however, only five remain-a 1/6 re-
duction in the voters from whom to harvest the outcome-
determinative "Yes."
To illustrate, assume a 0.1 probability that any Justice will
vote to grant certiorari in any case, and that three already have
decided to grant a certain petition. If six Justices are yet to
vote, the probability of granting certiorari is .47.32 With only
five remaining Justices, however, the probability of review drops
to .41, a difference of .06." This relationship remains constant,
although the ratios change, for all probabilities less than 1.0.u"
In fact, the absolute difference between probabilities for
certiorari with nine- and eight-Justice Courts increases for
32. Once the petition has garnered three affirmative votes, certiorari will
be denied only if all of the remaining Justices vote "No." If the probability of
a "No" vote is .9, the probability of n negative votes is .9n. Thus, with six
remaining Justices, the probability of denying certiorari is .53 and the
probability of granting certiorari is .47. For five remaining Justices the
numbers are .59 and .41, respectively.
33. The absolute difference in the two probabilities is 0.06 (.47 minus .41).
The relative difference, however, is much greater. That is, a petitioner in the
described circumstances is almost 15% more likely to obtain review from a
remaining pool of six rather than five Justices.
34. For example, assume a probability of only 0.05 that any Justice will
vote to grant certiorari in any case. Once there are three votes for a particular
petition, the likelihood that it will be granted is .265 on a nine-Justice Court,
but only .226 on an eight-Justice Court-a relative difference of about 17%.
1996] 663
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higher probabilities.35 In other words, the more certworthy the
case, the more keenly the petitioner will feel the loss of Justice
Emet's participation, even if Justice Emet is actually biased
against the petitioner. To understand this, we must assume
that a Supreme Court Justice only rarely, if ever, will self-
consciously cast a vote in pursuit of naked self-interest. Any
other presumption leads to the conclusion that Justices inten-
tionally, and therefore dishonestly, might vote to enrich them-
selves. If so, disqualification is a futile remedy. A corrupt
Justice will figure out a way to hide his or her financial interests
and to continue to participate in lucrative cases. The true
danger is that the Justice will try to be fair, but, due to human
frailty, will fail to overcome her partiality. In these circum-
stances, some possibility always exists that the Justice will be
able to put aside her interests and vote on the merits. It follows
that there always will be some possibility that even an overtly-
biased Justice Emet will vote to grant certiorari to the presump-
tively disfavored petitioner.
In our illustration, once three other Justices have decided to
vote in favor of certiorari, even a small possibility of a "Yes" from
Justice Emet becomes overwhelmingly important. A .05
probability of a "Yes" from Justice Emet results in at least a 5%
likelihood that certiorari will be granted, subject to increase by
the potential votes of the remaining Justices. A 0.2 probability
of a favorable vote from Emet raises the petitioner's chances to
at least 20%, and so on. 6 Thus, assuming that Justice Emet
is anything other than an outright hypocrite or thief, her recusal
in a meritorious case may decrease significantly the petitioner's
chances for certiorari. Indeed, even assuming that Justice Emet
is so biased that she is only half as likely to vote for certiorari as
are the other Justices, the availability of her biased vote
nonetheless increases the probability that the Court will grant
35. Thus, if the chance that a Justice will vote favorably is 0.2, the
likelihood of a fourth positive vote is about .738 on a nine-Justice Court, but
only .672 when there are eight Justices. Compare this absolute difference of
.066 with a difference of .06 for a favorable certiorari vote probability of 0.1,
supra note 33, and a difference of .039 for a favorable certiorari vote probability
of .05, supra note 34.
36. The ultimate increase in the probability of certiorari also depends upon
the probabilities that any of the other Justices will cast a favorable vote. See





During the only period for which such statistics are avail-
able, between 23% and 30% of all certiorari petitions granted
attracted only the minimum four positive votes."8 With no
votes to spare in those cases, the disqualification of a single
Justice therefore could affect dramatically a petitioner's access
to review."
III. WAIVER: A FURTHER CONTRADICTION
Even under current rules, recusal is not always a one-way
street. In some situations, the parties may remit or waive a
Justice's disqualification.40 Accordingly, an applicant who is
concerned about the diminished possibility of certiorari conceiv-
ably could cure the problem by waiving the disqualification of
the affected Justice. Unfortunately, three factors eliminate
waiver as an effective remedy to the certiorari conundrum.
First, all parties must agree to waive the disqualification of
37. For example, if there is a 0.2 probability that an unbiased Justice will
vote in favor of a certain certiorari petition, the probability of garnering Justice
Emet's presumably biased vote would be only 0.1. If three Justices favor the
writ, the likelihood of certiorari without Justice Emet's participation is roughly
.67. With Justice Emet voting, the probability of certiorari increases to about
.70, even assuming that her partiality halves her inclination to vote for the
petition. If Justice Emet is able to put aside her biases successfully and vote
on the same basis as the other Justices, the petitioner's chance of certiorari
increases to .74.
38. OBRIEN, supra note 15, at 250. The period was 1979-1981; figures were
gathered by examining Justice Stevens' docket books. Id.
39. The same infirmity infects the process of obtaining en banc review in
the federal appellate courts. Rehearing en banc may not be granted unless it
is "ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular
active service." 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988). That is, only an absolute majority of
the judges, not a majority of those who vote, can grant rehearing. Abstentions
and recusals, then, become the equivalent of "No" votes. The possible result of
this rule can be odd, depending upon the number of judges authorized and
appointed to the particular circuit. The First Circuit, for example, has only six
authorized judgeships. 41 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1988). Thus, the recusal of three
judges would render it impossible for the remaining three-even if unani-
mous-to grant rehearing en banc. The existence of an unfilled vacancy would
exacerbate this problem. In the Eighth Circuit, which has 11 active judges, the
recusal of one would require a 60% majority of the rest to grant rehearing; the
recusal of two would require a positive vote of two-thirds. Id. Pointedly, 28
U.S.C. § 46(b), (c) allow the designation of substitute judges to the initial three-
judge panels, but not to rehearing en banc. Regarding possible remedies, see
discussion infra part IV.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (1988).
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a judge; the consent of a single party is not sufficient.41 Thus,
even if the petitioner in our example is willing to waive Justice
Emet's disqualification, the respondent might make the strategic
choice to refrain from consenting in order to diminish the
possibility of certiorari. Of course, such a contrivance seems
unlikely because we presume that Justice Emet is biased
(consciously or otherwise) in favor of the respondent, who
therefore should be willing to allow the Justice to sit in the case.
This, however, brings us to a second, more significant problem.
The waiver of disqualification is an all-or-nothing propo-
sition. Federal judges are disqualified from "proceedings,"
defined as including the "pretrial, trial, appellate review, or
other states of litigation."42 Because there is no provision for
partial disqualification, there can be no partial waiver. Conse-
quently, if Justice Emet is allowed to participate in the certiorari
decision, she also will be able to hear the case on the merits. A
petitioner may remit the Justice's recusal in order to increase
the chance of Supreme Court review, but only at the risk of
having the presumably biased Justice decide the case should
review be granted. This is, at best, a Hobson's choice. The
petitioner, who is supposed to be protected by the disqualifi-
cation rules, either must accept the diminished likelihood of
certiorari, or must accede to the full participation of a judge who,
by statute, is considered partial to the other side.
Finally, many bases for disqualification are unwaivable.43
For example, under the terms of the United States Judicial
Code, a Justice may not sit in a case where she has "a financial
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding," regardless of the consent of the litigants.
"Financial interest" is defined as a legal or equitable interest,
"however small," or a relationship as director, advisor, or other
active participant in the affairs of a party.45 The irrevocable
disqualification obtains whether the holder of the "interest,"
individually or as a fiduciary, is the Justice, the Justice's spouse,
or a minor child residing in the Justice's home.46 In our
41. "No justice... may accept from the parties to the proceeding a waiver
." 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (emphasis added).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(1).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4). The United States Judicial Code provides a small
exception by allowing the Justice to continue sitting in certain circumstances
666 [Vol. 80:657
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example, then, Justice Emet's investment in one party irrevo-
cably disqualifies her from the case. The petitioner has no
choice but to seek certiorari from an eight-Justice Court.47
IV. WHAT MIGHT BE DONE
There are three possible responses to this dilemma. The
first requires congressional action, while the second could be
implemented solely by the Court. The final and most promising
solution could be effectuated either by legislation or by Court
rule.
A. LIMITED WAIVER
One solution would be for Congress to amend the United
States Judicial Code to allow a "certiorari-only" waiver of
disqualification, regardless of the ground. Under such a
provision, a presumptively disfavored litigant could consent to a
Justice's participation in the certiorari vote without having to
agree to the Justice's full involvement should the writ be
granted. In one stroke, all of the shortcomings of the current
law of waiver could be resolved: "unwaivable conflicts" would be
suspended for purposes of certiorari, the consent of the appar-
ently favored party no longer would be necessary, and the all-or-
nothing consequences of waiver would be eliminated. Though
reasonably simple to apply, however, this approach raises
numerous problems.
First, it would become necessary to recognize and define the
concepts of "apparently favored" and "presumptively disfavored"
parties, if only to determine whose consent is necessary for the
partial waiver. Without such a definition, a crafty respondent
could withhold consent as a strategy for decreasing the
petitioner's chances of Supreme Court review. In many cases, it
will be quite simple to determine the identity of the disfavored
party. For example, where a Justice's spouse or child is "acting
where a financial interest was discovered after "substantial judicial time has
been devoted to the matter," and where the Justice promptly divests the
interest. 28 U.S.C. § 455(f).
47. Recusal also is unwaivable when it is occasioned by actual bias or
prejudice, where the Justice previously served as a lawyer in the matter, where
the Justice participated in the matter in some governmental capacity, where a
close relative of the Justice is a party or a lawyer in the proceeding, or where
"a lawyer with whom [the Justice] previously practiced law served during such
association as a lawyer concerning the matter." 28 U.S.C. § 455(b).
1996]
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as a lawyer in the proceeding,"48 the presumptively disfavored
party will be the one who is not represented by the Justice's kin.
Other grounds for disqualification, however, will not lead to such
clear results. Consider, for instance, Justice Frankfurter's
decision not to sit in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollack49
because of his distaste for the radio music played on District of
Columbia busses. The case itself involved both the permissi-
bility of playing radio broadcasts on the busses and the nature
of the restrictions to be imposed, such as limiting volume or the
frequency and duration of commercials.5 ° As a radio-hater, it
would appear that Justice Frankfurter would tend to favor the
original plaintiffs, transit patrons like himself who had chal-
lenged the entire broadcast effort as infringing on their pri-
vacy.5' On the other hand, as a committed bus commuter, it
seems that Justice Frankfurter also should have an interest in
upholding the defendant Commission's limitations on com-
mercials,52 which he probably would have considered even more
annoying than the music. Although the Justice felt that he had
to recuse himself, he did not have to identify the apparently
favored party. It is not hard to imagine other situations where
the designations would be even less distinct.
The participation of the otherwise-disqualified Justice in the
certiorari deliberations presents a second problem. A presump-
tively disfavored litigant who sees the benefit of having Justice
Emet vote on a petition for certiorari nonetheless might be less
sanguine about having the Justice actively persuade her
colleagues to vote against it. This difficulty arises from the
nature of the cert-granting process itself. Although the over-
whelming majority of certiorari petitions are denied following
their circulation among the various chambers,53 a petition can
be placed on the "discuss list" and scheduled for the Court's
weekly conference at the request of a single Justice.54 The
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(ii) (describing the instances when a Justice
has a statutorily recognized bias in favor of one party).
49. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
50. Id.
51. See supra text accompanying note 8 (discussing Justice Frankfurter's
reasons for recusal in Pollack).
52. See supra text accompanying note 8 (same).
53. Failing to attract the interest of even a single Justice, the great
majority of certiorari petitions are "dead listed," and therefore never scheduled
for conference. REHNQUIST, supra note 26, at 266.
54. O'BRIEN, supra note 15, at 239; REHNQUIST, supra note 26, at 265.
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Court's conferences are confidential,55 so it is not known how
many of the "discuss list" petitions are truly debated, as opposed
simply to being voted upon. 6  Given the magnitude of the
workload, however, it seems likely that real dialogue is by far
the exception. By one estimate, the Justices would have to
average fewer than four minutes on each petition to discuss all
petitions actually brought to conference.57 Justice Antonin
Scalia has called the concept of discussion at the Court's
conferences "a misnomer,""8 and other Justices have remarked
that the members of the Court usually come to the conferences
with their votes already firmly in mind.5 9 Nonetheless, despite
these generalizations, some certiorari petitions must become the
subject of genuine deliberation. The outcome on these petitions
could be influenced by Justice Emet's biased argumentation,"
even though it cannot be affected by her biased vote.61
Of course, it might be possible to avoid the potential problem
by framing a certiorari-only waiver in such a way as to allow the
55. REHNQUIST, supra note 26, at 254.
56. Chief Justice Rehnquist once estimated that between 15% and 30% of
the "discuss list" petitions are actually discussed at conference. REHNQUIST,
supra note 26, at 265.
57. The Supreme Court meets for two days, from 10:00 in the morning until
4:30 in the afternoon, before the beginning of each term. If, as the available
statistics indicate, they schedule about 100 certiorari petitions each day, they
would be able to spend no more than 3.6 minutes on each one, excluding their
lunch break but including time spent on other administrative matters and social
interaction. The same estimate holds roughly for the Justices' Friday
conferences during the term. If anything, the time spent on certiorari petitions
would have to be reduced for conferences during the term because of the need
to discuss and vote upon cases argued the previous week. See O'BRIEN, supra
note 15, at 237-46 (discussing the number of petitions reviewed and the time
allotted); REHNQUIST, supra note 26, at 254, 265 (explaining the time, process,
and number of petitions for review).
58. O'BRIEN, supra note 15, at 244.
59. Id. (quoting Justice White). In the words of Justice Black: "Frequently
I'll mark at the top [of a petition] 'Denied-not of sufficient importance.' 'No
dispute among the circuits,' or something else. And I'll go in and vote to deny
it. Well, I've considered it to that extent. And every judge does that same thing
in [our] conference." Id. at 269.
60. Per Chief Justice Rehnquist, "[S]omething said at conference may
persuade me either to shift from a 'deny' to a 'grant,' or vice versa." REHNQUIST,
supra note 26, at 264. Cases, including certiorari petitions, also may be
discussed privately among two or more Justices, as well as in conference. See
O'BRIEN, supra note 15, at 241 (noting pre-conference meetings between
Justices Warren and Brennan).
61. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of
Justice Emet's biased vote).
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Justice to vote on the issue without participating in deliber-
ations. It is unlikely, however, that a Supreme Court Justice
would be willing to accept such an affront.62 Most Justices
probably would prefer to abstain completely, as would be their
option,63 rather than endure restricted participation. Moreover,
a statute prohibiting a Justice from joining deliberations is likely
to be unconstitutional, since it would invade the inner processes
of a coordinate branch of government.'
B. THREE-VOTE CERT
A second option would be for the Justices themselves to
relax the four-vote requirement for certiorari in situations where
one or more of their number is disqualified. Four-vote certiorari
is simply a product of Supreme Court tradition; there is nothing
magic or even statutory about it. 65 Indeed, it appears once to
have been the case that fewer votes were sufficient to grant
review. In the words of Chief Justice Hughes, "certiorari is
always granted if four justices think it should be, and not
infrequently, when [three], or even [two], justices strongly urge
the grant."6" The current rigid insistence on four votes thus
seems to be more a response to the pressures of an increasing
caseload rather than the product of principle.
As noted above, the four-vote rule now effectively turns
62. As Justice William 0. Douglas once remarked, "I, for one, could not
agree to give anyone any more control over when I vote than over how I vote."
O'BRIEN, supra note 15, at 231.
63. A Justice whose recusal for bias was waived nonetheless retains an
inherent right to abstain from the certiorari vote. O'BRIEN, supra note 15, at
226. Justice Frankfurter, however, was known to vote against allowing
certiorari petitions, and then to abstain on the merits if he believed that the
Court had erroneously granted the petition. O'BRIEN, supra note 15, at 251
(citing David N. Atkinson, Opinion Writing on the Supreme Court, 1949-1956:
The Views of Justice Sherman Minton, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 105 (1975)).
64. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Nor could the Supreme Court itself adopt
a rule to the same effect, as it would run afoul of 28 U.S.C. § 455 as it is now
written. It is conceivable, but farfetched, that Congress might amend § 455 to
allow certiorari-only waivers, to be followed by the Court's adoption of a non-
deliberation rule or custom.
65. See supra note 26 (explaining the four-vote certiorari requirement as a
product of Supreme Court tradition).
66. O'BRIEN, supra note 15, at 247 (quoting from a speech delivered by the
Chief Justice to the American Law Institute on May 6, 1937 entitled Reason as
Opposed to the Tyranny of Force, in VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 458, 459
(1937)).
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abstentions into "No" votes.67 The institution of a three-vote
rule would do the opposite, essentially turning the first recusal
into a "Yes." In the abstract, there is no reason to prefer one
result over the other. Any requirement of an absolute number
dictates that all votes ultimately will be counted, one way or the
other. Following recusals, the Court has no choice but to select
a default. The choice of that default rule ought to be based on
considerations of fairness and efficiency.
If reduction of caseload is the exclusive and overriding goal
of the certiorari process, then it obviously makes sense to
continue counting recusals as "Nays" by requiring four affirma-
tive votes in all cases. On the other hand, although important
to the outcome on individual petitions," it is likely that the
shift to a three-vote rule in recusal situations would have only
a slight impact on the Court's overall caseload. In most years,
over three-fourths of certiorari petitions are denied unanimously,
being placed on the "dead list" without a single favorable vote.69
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, up to 85% of the petitions
that do make it onto the "discuss list" nonetheless are denied
summarily.70 Of the petitions that are granted, in some years
as many as half receive eight or nine votes, and as many as 80%
receive five or more.7' Thus, although there exist some cliff-
hanger petitions that teeter on the edge of being granted, they
are relatively few. A wholesale shift to three-vote certiorari no
doubt would lead to a significant increase in the Court's
caseload. A recusal-only shift to three votes, in contrast,
probably would have no measurable impact at all. And, of
course, any cases that were added as a result of the change
would be those that were favored by three Justices-in other
words, the most certworthy of the lot.
There is another reason to consider shifting to a three-vote
67. See supra text accompanying note 31 (stating that only "Yes" votes are
counted for certiorari).
68. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text (illustrating the reduced
probability of obtaining certiorari with less than a nine-Justice Court).
69. See O'BRIEN, supra note 15, at 245-46 (pointing out that as many as
79% of petitions were unanimously denied in 1973, while another 4% received
a single vote); REHNQUIST, supra note 26, at 264-65 (stating that between one
and two thousand petitions are patently without merit; no Justice would have
the least interest in granting them).
70. REHNQUIST, supra note 26, at 264-65.
71. O'BRIEN, supra note 15, at 245-46, 248. But see supra note 38 and




rule in cases where a Justice is disqualified. Under the four-vote
system, there is a risk that a petition will be denied erroneously
due to the nonparticipation of a single Justice.72 Such a lapse
precludes all further review of the case, denies the aggrieved
litigant a day in court, and may result in perpetuating inaccu-
rate or mistaken law. In other words, the risk of non-certiorari
is a risk on the merits. On the other hand, an erroneous grant
of certiorari means only that the subject case will be briefed and
argued. The Justices presumably will still decide the case
correctly on its merits. Hence, the risk of over-certiorari is only
one of process. Of course, there will be an incremental burden
on the Court, but it is not likely to amount to more than a case
or two each term. Importantly, there is no fixed quota or ceiling
on the number of cases that the Court will agree to hear. In
other words, the certiorari derby is not a zero-sum competition
among petitioners. Thus, a slightly precipitous grant to one
litigant will not preclude another case from being heard.
Still, three-vote cert presents problems, chief among them
the difficulty of determining when it ought to come into play.
Applying the three-vote alternative whenever a Justice has been
disqualified is inappropriate, because that approach would
benefit both apparently favored and presumptively disfavored
petitioners. A three-vote rule would have the effect of casting
the disqualified Justice's ballot in favor of certiorari. Allowing
the benefit to inure to the party who is the beneficiary of the
Justice's supposed bias defeats the entire purpose of the remedy.
The goal is to relieve a presumptively disfavored party from the
impediment of seeking certiorari from an eight-Justice Court,
not to give additional assistance to a financially or familially
related litigant.
73
Indeed, if a three-vote certiorari rule were to be employed in
every instance of recusal, some would-be petitioners would no
doubt maneuver vigorously to obtain the disqualification of a
Justice, any Justice. Certain relatives of members of the Court
could guarantee that their names on a certiorari petition would
carry the promise of at least a one-vote equivalent. Thus, a
three-vote rule clearly could be applied only to petitions brought
by a presumptively disfavored party. This application would
72. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text (illustrating reduced
probability of obtaining certiorari with fewer Justices voting).
73. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussing the
importance of safeguarding against disadvantage in the judicial system).
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avoid most of the strategic ploys described above, since it would
be impossible for a party intentionally to create such disqualify-
ing interests.7' As we have seen, however, attempting to
identify the apparently favored and presumptively disfavored
parties is a daunting task." In cases involving multiple
parties, cross complaints, or other complexities, the job becomes
still harder. It is even possible for a Justice to be disqualified
where there is neither an apparently favored nor a presump-
tively disfavored party, as might be the case where the Justice
has a "financial interest in the subject matter in controversy."7"
To be useful at all, then, a three-vote default rule would have to
be applied on a bright-line basis. Since the necessary desig-
nations seem indistinct at best, such an approach is not practi-
cable.
C. SUBSTITUTE JUSTICES
A more promising alternative is for Congress to enact a
"substitute-Justice" provision allowing for the temporary
replacement of a disqualified Justice, perhaps with the Chief
Judge of the District of Columbia Circuit." Many states
already have comparable provisions," as do the federal appel-
74. You cannot force a Justice to buy stock in the opposing party, 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(4), force the other side to retain the Justice's daughter or nephew,
§ 455(b)(5)(ii), or make the Justice or a former partner of the Justice a material
witness. § 455(b)(2). A party, or its lawyer, could engage in conduct that
would cause a Justice to become prejudiced, but courts generally hold that bias
produced by the proceedings is not disqualifying. Liteky v. United States, 114
S. Ct. 1147, 1155 (1994); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1003 (5th Cir.
1981). There is one possible exception. The Justices must all file financial
disclosure statements. § 455(c). It, therefore, would be possible for a crafty
lawyer to sue or implead a company whose stock is owned by a Justice of the
Supreme Court, thereby requiring disqualification and insuring the benefit of
three-vote certiorari. Such a tactic seems unlikely, though, since it would have
to be triggered at the trial court level, long before one reasonably could begin
strategizing toward certiorari.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52 (discussing a case where the
favored and disfavored party designations are not readily apparent).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
77. The use of a non-Supreme Court judge would require legislative
authorization and subsequent confirmation by the Senate of any judge who
might be enlisted. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (giving Congress the power to
"ordain and establish" inferior courts); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving
power to appoint Supreme Court Justices to the Senate as well as the
President).
78. For state constitutional provisions, see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6
(providing for the assignment of judges to other courts); DEL. CONST. art. IV,
1996]
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late courts, 9 so that courts seldom decide cases with less than
a full complement of judges."°
There may be constitutional or normative reasons, beyond
the scope of this essay, to oppose the institution of a temporary
§ 12 (same); GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (same); IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 6 (same);
KY. CONsT. art. VI, § 110(3) (same); N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 1, 2 (same); N.M.
CONST. art. VI, § 6 (same); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11 (same); UTAH CONST. art.
VIII, § 2 (same). For state statutory provisions, see for example, HAW. REV.
STAT. § 602-10 (1993) (providing for the assignment of judges to other courts);
IND. CODE. ANN. § 33-2.1-2-5 (Burns 1992) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.225(5)
(1986) (same); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:3 (1983) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-
3-60 (1977) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 16-1-5 (1987) (same).
California presents a particularly interesting case because the state
constitution requires the concurrence of four participating justices in every
judgment of its supreme court. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 2. Thus, upon the
disqualification of two justices, a 3-2 vote of the remaining five would be
insufficient to enterjudgment. This problem will not arise in practice, however,
because the chief justice of California is empowered to appoint substitutes for
recused justices. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6. In Mosk v. Superior Court, 601 P.2d
1030 (Cal. 1979) (per curiam), all seven justices of the California Supreme Court
were disqualified from participating, and a substitute panel of seven appellate
court justices was constituted by lot; that panel subsequently upheld its own
authority to preside. Substitute state supreme courts also were empaneled in
State ex rel. Langer v. Kositzky, 166 N.W. 534 (N.D. 1918), Yelle v. Kramer, 520
P.2d 927 (Wash. 1974), and State Bd. of Law Examiners v. Spriggs, 155 P.2d
285 (Wyo. 1945).
79. A circuit court of appeal must decide cases in panels of three, "at least
a majority of whom shall be judges of that court, unless such judges cannot sit
because recused or disqualified," in which case a judge from another appellate
or district court may hear the case by designation. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1988). In
contrast, should the Supreme Court, by reason of disqualification, lack a
quorum for a particular case, the matter must be affirmed as though by an
equally divided Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1988); see also Chrysler Corp. v.
United States, 314 U.S. 583 (1941) (per curiam) (dismissing case for want of a
quorum).
80. Allowing for substitute judges at the Supreme Court level not only
would solve the certiorari conundrum, but also would avoid the unsatisfactory
result of affirmance by an equally divided Court. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S.
824, 837-38 (1972) (mem.) (explaining a decision not to recuse, in part, on the
undesirability of four-four affirmances). The problem is not insignificant. From
the beginning of 1992 until the end of May 1995, the Supreme Court decided 32
cases without the participation of at least one Justice. Significant social issues
such as abortion rights and public religious displays have been the subject of
four-four decisions. See Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171, 172 (1987), affg per
curiam 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985) (involving abortion rights); Board of
Trustees v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985), affgper curiam 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir.
1984) (involving a creche display in a public park). Other recent examples of
four-four affirmances include Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins.,
114 S. Ct. 1827 (1994) (per curiam); Trans World Airlines v. Independent Fed'n
of Flight Attendants, 485 U.S. 175 (1988) (per curiam); and Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 481 U.S. 735 (1987) (per curiam).
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"tenth Justice."8' Some of these objections could be answered
by utilizing the services of retired Supreme Court Justices,
where available.82 In addition, it might be possible to empanel
the substitute solely for the certiorari vote, with an eight-Justice
Court deciding the merits should review be granted. Indeed,
current law provides that a retired Supreme Court Justice may
continue to receive full salary only if he or she performs
substantial judicial duties, which may include courtroom
participation, motion decisions, or administrative duties.83
Temporary certiorari assignment easily fits the description of
"substantial judicial duties not involving courtroom partici-
pation," 4 and therefore might be a desirable form of activity for
a retired Justice. Since a retired Supreme Court Justice may
"retain the office,"8 5 there should be no constitutional or statu-
tory impediment should the Chief Justice occasionally ask a
retired Justice to vote on certiorari petitions. If no retired
Justice is available or willing to substitute for the certiorari vote,
the Court would have to proceed, as now, with eight members.
CONCLUSION
As often as not, courts implement judicial disqualification
to maintain the appearance of impartiality. 6 It is vexing,
however, to invoke that principle when the palpable consequence
is to damage the prospects of the very litigant whose interests
ought to be protected. Yet this is exactly what occurs as a result
of the certiorari conundrum. Of the possible remedies to this
anomalous situation, the best seems to be the judicious use of
81. Chief Justice Warren Burger once suggested the creation of a panel of
senior judges to review certiorari petitions and make recommendations for
acceptances to the Supreme Court. According to David O'Brien, there was
"vehement opposition" to the proposal. O'BRIEN, supra note 15, at 236. "The
Justices refused to give up control over their docket and agenda setting." Id.
82. A Justice may "retain the office but retire from regular active service."
28 U.S.C. § 371(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993). Thus, there would appear to be no
statutory impediment to a Court rule (or practice) that calls upon retired
Justices to participate in certain votes. As of this writing, there are four retired
Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Lewis F. Powell, William
Brennan, Harry Blackmun, and Byron White.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 371(f)(1).
84. Id.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 371(b)(1).
86. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988);
Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986); SHAMAN ET AL., supra note
17, at 100; Steven Lubet, Legal Ethics: Judicial Impropriety and Reversible
Error, ClM1. JUST., Spring 1988, at 26-27.
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retired Supreme Court Justices, at least for certiorari votes if
not for the entire proceeding.
In truth, though, it seems unlikely that anyone will tinker
with the procedures of the Supreme Court. While the certiorari
conundrum undoubtedly results in some transient unfairness to
a distinct group of petitioners, it does not interfere with the
Court's overall ability to resolve or clarify federal and constitu-
tional legal issues. Perhaps the denial of a particular certiorari
petition means that an important question will not be addressed
this term, but there is always next term. Does this detract from
individual justice? Of course. The entire structure of the
certiorari system, however, makes individual justice a low
priority.
So why pay any attention to the certiorari conundrum?
There are two reasons. First, it is important to recognize the
unique costs of disqualification at the certiorari stage. Once
aware of the phenomenon, Supreme Court Justices might choose
not to err on the side of disqualification, particularly if the
recusal issue is close or based only on remote appearances.
Second, once a Justice has been disqualified, at least one of the
other eight now or then might be more inclined to vote for
certiorari in an individual case, cognizant of the extra hurdle
facing the petitioner.
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